CityRail: Getting Toronto Moving was published in Urban Toronto on January 28, reintroducing the CityRail concept. It has generated considerable interest and feedback. Best of all, it has inspired people to build on the concept with maps and presentations. Designer Iain M. Campbell created an extraordinary graphical presentation that effectively explains what CityRail is and why we need it. There is also an excellent new map of the concept.
CityRail now enjoys a permanent home on its new Facebook group. Only a week old, it already has over 70 members and is growing quickly. There is also a CityRail Twitter account for immediate notification of all updates: @CityRailToronto.
I hope that the momentum of the CityRail concept and the campaign for rapid transit on our existing rail corridors will continue to build. There will be many articles to come going into greater detail and explaining the benefits that CityRail will bring.
Showing posts with label CityRail. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CityRail. Show all posts
Thursday, February 6, 2014
Thursday, December 12, 2013
Reacting to the Neptis Big Move Transit Review
This article is shared with Urban Toronto.
Debates over Metrolinx's Big Move returned to the headlines this week with the release of a detailed new report prepared by planner Michael Schabas for the Neptis Foundation. While some observers may dismiss it as “yet another” study of transit in Toronto, we can never have too much information about a plan that will, after all, cost tens of billions of dollars. The report brings some useful and occasionally provocative suggestions to the table and also effectively criticizes some of the weakness of the GTA’s transit planning process. This article will examine some of Schabas’ conclusions.
Regional Rail and Fare Integration
I was extremely pleased to read a detailed assessment of the enormous benefits for reasonable cost that would be produced by real regional rail in Toronto. As Schabas effectively argues, Metrolinx’s GO electrification study was flawed as it concentrated on a mediocre and arbitrary 30-minute frequency that research demonstrates is inadequate to generate the massive ridership increase that comes from passengers not needing to rely on schedules, and because it insisted on the retention of massive 10-car bi-level trains. Both of these assumptions greatly limit the potential benefits of electric multiple unit operation. More importantly, the study did not consider the huge ridership that could be gained by allowing riders to pay the same fare to ride regional rail and local transit. (More on fare integration in an upcoming article)
Schabas’ solution is to maintain a separate fleet of locomotive-hauled bi-levels for peak period service while using smaller electric multiple unit trains to maintain high frequency off-peak. While certainly a better approach than 30-minute infrequent bi-levels all day, it does not correspond with best practices on most real regional rail systems. They manage with a single fleet for peak and off-peak even with far higher ridership than Toronto. Many German S-Bahn systems, for example, move far more people than GO in the peak periods with single-level multiple units. They accomplish this through high frequency, just like the subway, which also moves far more people than GO. Bi-level cars may seem like a reasonable solution to add capacity, but in fact they are one of the biggest causes of capacity limitations on the system: because they take so long to unload at Union Station, headways are severely limited. With a better platform layout and EMU trains with no stairs and more doors per car to speed loading and unloading, frequencies of five minutes or better would be possible. Such a system would be able to move far more people in the peak period than even GO’s massive 12-car trains.
The benefits of EMUs go far beyond shorter headways and reduced emissions; a cutting-edge regional rail multiple unit like the Stadler FLIRT or comparable models from Bombardier would provide dramatic acceleration improvements over existing GO trains. A FLIRT making all stops from Hamilton, for example, would be as fast as existing GO trains from Hamilton running express after Oakville. This would permit the addition of more stops for rapid-transit-style service without sacrificing travel times. (The benefits of electrification will be examined in greater detail in a future article.)
Loco-hauled trains could be retained if necessary for longer distance trains to outlying cities like Kitchener or Barrie, which would likely be limited-stop services where acceleration is less important.
The Downtown Relief Line
The Neptis report goes a bit astray when it examines the Downtown Relief Line. There is no question that real regional rail (not “GO Trains,” as has been reported in the media) would provide significant relief to the subway system. However, that is only one of the many benefits of the DRL.
The DRL would be extremely useful even in the context of CityRail because it would provide service to riders in the few areas that aren’t particularly well served by regional rail. Schabas suggests that riders on the Danforth line could easily transfer to regional rail at Main Street, but that connection is in reality quite awkward. Given that passengers would be required to walk considerably further than the Spadina station connection between Bloor and YUS lines, it is likely that relatively few people would choose it over continuing to transfer at Bloor-Yonge.
The effect on the Yonge Line north of Bloor would also be limited. Most riders on the line, which will become increasingly overcrowded as it is extended north, transfer from connecting bus routes from the east. These riders would switch en masse to a Don Mills extension of the DRL, dramatically reducing congestion on Yonge and providing much better service to riders in that part of the city. Unlike the Georgetown corridor, for example, regional rail in the Richmond Hill corridor would not connect very effectively with surface routes because of its deep valley location.
Finally, the DRL serves some of the fastest-developing parts of the city. The waterfront, East Bayfront, Portlands, Cityplace, and Leslieville areas are all seeing massive growth and development. Furthermore, it serves areas where existing transit service is slow and unreliable. It could reverse the significant ridership declines that the east-west downtown streetcar routes have suffered over the past two decades.
The key problem with the cost/benefit case for the DRL as evaluated in the Neptis report is the extraordinarily high cost estimate provided by Metrolinx. The most striking feature of almost all transit planning reports over the past decade is the complete absence of attention to cost control. Very few studies include an examination of different approaches (i.e. underground vs. elevated) or routes and the cost implications. This is in stark contrast with earlier reports, such as the original 1985 Downtown Relief Line study, in which cost was the primary factor being considered when different routes were evaluated. That report concluded that the most economical routing would be along the rail corridor from Bay Street to the Don River, where vacant land is available for a subway. The cost savings would surely be dramatic since virtually no new infrastructure beyond tracks and surface stations would be required in that segment. It would have the added benefit of running right through the heart of the rapidly developing East Bayfront and West Don Lands areas. Such a route does not appear to have been considered in the contemporary DRL reports. The Don Mills segment, as well, is planned to be built entirely underground even though an elevated routing through that area would clearly be feasible and would likely produce enormous cost savings (See "The Rising Cost of Rapid Transit Construction" for more detail). Underground construction costs in Toronto are becoming increasingly out-of-line when compared with peer cities both in Canada and Europe.
Schabas uncovers a particularly striking case of inattention to costs in the Scarborough rapid transit Benefits Case Assessment:
“TTC seems to be requiring a fairly elaborate and expensive yard. The BCA (which was prepared by consultants) notes, ‘The cost of a Vancouver facility with comparable capacity was roughly $200m lower, although the yard alignment and maintenance practices differ from the TTC’s.’ If Metrolinx thinks there may be the opportunity to save $200 million, surely it should give this more attention than a short footnote?” (60)
Automated Light Metro
Certainly one of the most provocative elements of the Neptis report is its advocacy for automated light metro. While the technology has been extremely popular and successfully implemented around the world, in cities as varied as Copenhagen, Paris, London, Vancouver, Tokyo, Moscow, and Madrid, debates about transit in Toronto have remained rigidly within the subway vs. light rail framework.
Part of the blame for the technology falling out of fashion in Toronto comes from the Scarborough RT, which is the only example of automated light metro in the GTA (though the TTC chooses to have an operator in the cab). This is a poor example of the technology, however, that should not discredit an entire approach to transit. Automated light metro does not need to rely on a proprietary technology like the RT with its complicated and sometimes problematic linear induction propulsion system. At its simplest, automated light metro is just a driverless, fully grade-separated train that is lighter and quieter than the subway to facilitate elevated operation when desired.
The Neptis report illustrates a number of significant benefits to the Automated Light Metro technology. Its operating costs over the long term are significantly lower than non-grade-separated light rail since it does not require a driver. The lack of a driver also makes it possible to run shorter trains at maximum frequency all the time for no additional cost. This is a major benefit on less busy routes where the need for a driver could result in unreasonably long waits for passengers. Vehicle costs, in many cases, are also lower than for LRT at a given passenger capacity. Schabas makes the case fairly effectively that automated light metro would be suitable for the Eglinton line, providing faster trips, better frequencies, and greater reliability. Altogether, he persuasively argues that it would provide a significantly better cost/benefit ratio over the long term than the existing LRT plan.
The Neptis report also underplays the enormous importance of transfers from feeder buses in providing the high ridership that makes Toronto’s existing suburban rapid transit so successful. The large majority of riders at Toronto’s suburban subway stations don’t walk to the station from the surrounding neighbourhood; instead, they arrive by bus. There has not been much study about whether bus riders will transfer to a surface LRT that only offers, according to Metrolinx, about 25% faster trips than a bus. This is of critical importance on Eglinton, since if passengers on north-south bus routes decide to stay on the bus until they reach the Danforth line, rather than transferring to the Eglinton Crosstown, it would make the justification of the multi-billion dollar project much weaker.
The Canada Line in Vancouver is an excellent example of an automated light metro line with a comparable capacity and length to the Eglinton Crosstown line (more on this subject here). It is, however, completely grade-separated and so will offer a considerably faster and more reliable trip than a surface LRT that faces obstruction from traffic lights. It is also fully automated, permitting higher frequencies and lower operating costs, particularly off-peak. Built as a public-private partnership, it cost governments $2.5 billion—less than half of the Eglinton Crosstown—and was completed in time for the 2010 Olympics as planned.
Of course, all of these points assume that redesigning the Eglinton line yet again is desirable. Certainly, it would do nothing to dispel the image of disarray that has surrounded many recent Toronto transit projects. It could also bring significant cancellation costs, though they might be reduced if Bombardier is retained to produce the vehicles for the redesigned line. While it is difficult to argue with Schabas when he says that this project will be with us for decades so it should be built right, there are significant costs to halting and redesigning the project yet again and the risk of the useful project falling through entirely is very real.
Debates over Metrolinx's Big Move returned to the headlines this week with the release of a detailed new report prepared by planner Michael Schabas for the Neptis Foundation. While some observers may dismiss it as “yet another” study of transit in Toronto, we can never have too much information about a plan that will, after all, cost tens of billions of dollars. The report brings some useful and occasionally provocative suggestions to the table and also effectively criticizes some of the weakness of the GTA’s transit planning process. This article will examine some of Schabas’ conclusions.
Regional Rail and Fare Integration
I was extremely pleased to read a detailed assessment of the enormous benefits for reasonable cost that would be produced by real regional rail in Toronto. As Schabas effectively argues, Metrolinx’s GO electrification study was flawed as it concentrated on a mediocre and arbitrary 30-minute frequency that research demonstrates is inadequate to generate the massive ridership increase that comes from passengers not needing to rely on schedules, and because it insisted on the retention of massive 10-car bi-level trains. Both of these assumptions greatly limit the potential benefits of electric multiple unit operation. More importantly, the study did not consider the huge ridership that could be gained by allowing riders to pay the same fare to ride regional rail and local transit. (More on fare integration in an upcoming article)
Schabas’ solution is to maintain a separate fleet of locomotive-hauled bi-levels for peak period service while using smaller electric multiple unit trains to maintain high frequency off-peak. While certainly a better approach than 30-minute infrequent bi-levels all day, it does not correspond with best practices on most real regional rail systems. They manage with a single fleet for peak and off-peak even with far higher ridership than Toronto. Many German S-Bahn systems, for example, move far more people than GO in the peak periods with single-level multiple units. They accomplish this through high frequency, just like the subway, which also moves far more people than GO. Bi-level cars may seem like a reasonable solution to add capacity, but in fact they are one of the biggest causes of capacity limitations on the system: because they take so long to unload at Union Station, headways are severely limited. With a better platform layout and EMU trains with no stairs and more doors per car to speed loading and unloading, frequencies of five minutes or better would be possible. Such a system would be able to move far more people in the peak period than even GO’s massive 12-car trains.
The benefits of EMUs go far beyond shorter headways and reduced emissions; a cutting-edge regional rail multiple unit like the Stadler FLIRT or comparable models from Bombardier would provide dramatic acceleration improvements over existing GO trains. A FLIRT making all stops from Hamilton, for example, would be as fast as existing GO trains from Hamilton running express after Oakville. This would permit the addition of more stops for rapid-transit-style service without sacrificing travel times. (The benefits of electrification will be examined in greater detail in a future article.)
Loco-hauled trains could be retained if necessary for longer distance trains to outlying cities like Kitchener or Barrie, which would likely be limited-stop services where acceleration is less important.
| CityRail Plan central area, cartography by Craig White |
The Downtown Relief Line
The Neptis report goes a bit astray when it examines the Downtown Relief Line. There is no question that real regional rail (not “GO Trains,” as has been reported in the media) would provide significant relief to the subway system. However, that is only one of the many benefits of the DRL.
The DRL would be extremely useful even in the context of CityRail because it would provide service to riders in the few areas that aren’t particularly well served by regional rail. Schabas suggests that riders on the Danforth line could easily transfer to regional rail at Main Street, but that connection is in reality quite awkward. Given that passengers would be required to walk considerably further than the Spadina station connection between Bloor and YUS lines, it is likely that relatively few people would choose it over continuing to transfer at Bloor-Yonge.
The effect on the Yonge Line north of Bloor would also be limited. Most riders on the line, which will become increasingly overcrowded as it is extended north, transfer from connecting bus routes from the east. These riders would switch en masse to a Don Mills extension of the DRL, dramatically reducing congestion on Yonge and providing much better service to riders in that part of the city. Unlike the Georgetown corridor, for example, regional rail in the Richmond Hill corridor would not connect very effectively with surface routes because of its deep valley location.
Finally, the DRL serves some of the fastest-developing parts of the city. The waterfront, East Bayfront, Portlands, Cityplace, and Leslieville areas are all seeing massive growth and development. Furthermore, it serves areas where existing transit service is slow and unreliable. It could reverse the significant ridership declines that the east-west downtown streetcar routes have suffered over the past two decades.
| The Downtown Relief Line, map by Christopher Livett |
The key problem with the cost/benefit case for the DRL as evaluated in the Neptis report is the extraordinarily high cost estimate provided by Metrolinx. The most striking feature of almost all transit planning reports over the past decade is the complete absence of attention to cost control. Very few studies include an examination of different approaches (i.e. underground vs. elevated) or routes and the cost implications. This is in stark contrast with earlier reports, such as the original 1985 Downtown Relief Line study, in which cost was the primary factor being considered when different routes were evaluated. That report concluded that the most economical routing would be along the rail corridor from Bay Street to the Don River, where vacant land is available for a subway. The cost savings would surely be dramatic since virtually no new infrastructure beyond tracks and surface stations would be required in that segment. It would have the added benefit of running right through the heart of the rapidly developing East Bayfront and West Don Lands areas. Such a route does not appear to have been considered in the contemporary DRL reports. The Don Mills segment, as well, is planned to be built entirely underground even though an elevated routing through that area would clearly be feasible and would likely produce enormous cost savings (See "The Rising Cost of Rapid Transit Construction" for more detail). Underground construction costs in Toronto are becoming increasingly out-of-line when compared with peer cities both in Canada and Europe.
Schabas uncovers a particularly striking case of inattention to costs in the Scarborough rapid transit Benefits Case Assessment:
“TTC seems to be requiring a fairly elaborate and expensive yard. The BCA (which was prepared by consultants) notes, ‘The cost of a Vancouver facility with comparable capacity was roughly $200m lower, although the yard alignment and maintenance practices differ from the TTC’s.’ If Metrolinx thinks there may be the opportunity to save $200 million, surely it should give this more attention than a short footnote?” (60)
Automated Light Metro
Certainly one of the most provocative elements of the Neptis report is its advocacy for automated light metro. While the technology has been extremely popular and successfully implemented around the world, in cities as varied as Copenhagen, Paris, London, Vancouver, Tokyo, Moscow, and Madrid, debates about transit in Toronto have remained rigidly within the subway vs. light rail framework.
Part of the blame for the technology falling out of fashion in Toronto comes from the Scarborough RT, which is the only example of automated light metro in the GTA (though the TTC chooses to have an operator in the cab). This is a poor example of the technology, however, that should not discredit an entire approach to transit. Automated light metro does not need to rely on a proprietary technology like the RT with its complicated and sometimes problematic linear induction propulsion system. At its simplest, automated light metro is just a driverless, fully grade-separated train that is lighter and quieter than the subway to facilitate elevated operation when desired.
The Neptis report illustrates a number of significant benefits to the Automated Light Metro technology. Its operating costs over the long term are significantly lower than non-grade-separated light rail since it does not require a driver. The lack of a driver also makes it possible to run shorter trains at maximum frequency all the time for no additional cost. This is a major benefit on less busy routes where the need for a driver could result in unreasonably long waits for passengers. Vehicle costs, in many cases, are also lower than for LRT at a given passenger capacity. Schabas makes the case fairly effectively that automated light metro would be suitable for the Eglinton line, providing faster trips, better frequencies, and greater reliability. Altogether, he persuasively argues that it would provide a significantly better cost/benefit ratio over the long term than the existing LRT plan.
The Neptis report also underplays the enormous importance of transfers from feeder buses in providing the high ridership that makes Toronto’s existing suburban rapid transit so successful. The large majority of riders at Toronto’s suburban subway stations don’t walk to the station from the surrounding neighbourhood; instead, they arrive by bus. There has not been much study about whether bus riders will transfer to a surface LRT that only offers, according to Metrolinx, about 25% faster trips than a bus. This is of critical importance on Eglinton, since if passengers on north-south bus routes decide to stay on the bus until they reach the Danforth line, rather than transferring to the Eglinton Crosstown, it would make the justification of the multi-billion dollar project much weaker.
| Vancouver's Canada Line, image by Michael Berry from Wikipedia |
The Canada Line in Vancouver is an excellent example of an automated light metro line with a comparable capacity and length to the Eglinton Crosstown line (more on this subject here). It is, however, completely grade-separated and so will offer a considerably faster and more reliable trip than a surface LRT that faces obstruction from traffic lights. It is also fully automated, permitting higher frequencies and lower operating costs, particularly off-peak. Built as a public-private partnership, it cost governments $2.5 billion—less than half of the Eglinton Crosstown—and was completed in time for the 2010 Olympics as planned.
Of course, all of these points assume that redesigning the Eglinton line yet again is desirable. Certainly, it would do nothing to dispel the image of disarray that has surrounded many recent Toronto transit projects. It could also bring significant cancellation costs, though they might be reduced if Bombardier is retained to produce the vehicles for the redesigned line. While it is difficult to argue with Schabas when he says that this project will be with us for decades so it should be built right, there are significant costs to halting and redesigning the project yet again and the risk of the useful project falling through entirely is very real.
Sunday, October 14, 2012
The Interaction of Freight and Passenger Rail
Anyone who has ever ridden a train in
Europe (let alone Japan) has seen that they know how to run a railway. Their
passenger trains are faster, more reliable, more extensive, and far more
frequent than in North America. Unless one enjoys hopping freight cars,
however, it is less obvious but no less true that North America has many
lessons to teach Europe about freight rail. In fact, Canadian railways move
almost as many tonne-kilometres of freight per year as moves by rail in the
entire European Union – 349.1 billion tonne-kilometres
in Canada versus 377 billion in Europe.
Canadian freight railways benefit from long distances and shipments of bulk
natural resources, but the figure remains striking given the difference in
population and economic size.
In recent decades, North American railways
have become increasingly reliable and economical providers of freight
transportation service. They’ve expanded beyond their traditional dominance in
hauling bulk goods like coal and grain over long distances and have made major
gains in hauling manufactured goods since the invention of the intermodal
container. Canada’s own CN is often considered the gold standard of freight
railways worldwide. Meanwhile, in Europe, most bulk traffic uses the
continent’s extensive inland waterway network, while lighter goods tend to move
by truck.
Operating a successful freight railway
presents very different challenges from passenger rail. The most important
criteria of success for freight rail are cost, followed distantly by
reliability. As long as their goods arrive within a few hours of promised and the
bill is lower than if they had gone by truck, most shippers are quite pleased.
Low cost is achieved by packing as much as possible into each freight car, and
as many cars onto each train. Over the past several decades, North American
freight railways have invested billions into improving their infrastructure to
increase their competitiveness. Tracks have been upgraded to accommodate
heavier freight cars, new technologies like locomotives distributed throughout
the train have permitted longer trains, and bridges and tunnels have been
raised to permit the stacking of two shipping containers on each car. European
freight cars look like toys compared to their North American counterparts and
double-stacked containers are unheard-of. The average European train is less
than thirty cars long, while more than a hundred cars per train is the rule in
North America.
North American passenger rail operators are
often quite reasonably accused of trying to operate as if they were freight
railways, using freight locomotives, freight track maintenance standards and
freight signalling systems. Europeans make the same mistake in reverse, trying
to emulate their success in passenger rail by emphasizing the importance of
speed and punctuality, even going so far as to propose running freight trains
on high-speed lines. This does nothing to aid in the critical factor of cost
per ton-mile. The limited amount of existing freight rail traffic makes large
investment seem excessive, just as the low ridership of North America’s weak
passenger rail service is used to claim that passenger rail investment is uneconomic.
Of course demand is low when the service is poor; demand won’t get any higher
until the service is improved.
The poor state of European freight rail is
a clear demonstration of the difficulty of operating both a successful
passenger and freight railway. The needs of the two types of trains are simply too
different. In fact, much of what makes European passenger rail so successful
causes serious problems for freight. Heavy North American freight trains wreak
havoc on high-quality track built for high-speed passenger service. Europe’s
extensive track electrification offers enormous benefits, but it also limits
overhead clearance for double-stack containers. High platforms at stations
permit passengers to board without needing to climb stairs, speeding loading
and providing wheelchair accessibility. Unfortunately, they can also restrict
the width of passing freight trains. Some of the problems are simply the result
of history, particularly in Britain where railways were built in the Victorian
age to a very narrow loading gauge. New European lines are built to minimize
curves, a big problem for high-speed passenger trains, but which comes at the cost
of steeper grades that are a nightmare for heavy freight trains. European
railways have been built over decades for passenger rail, not freight, so it
isn’t surprising that European freight railways have struggled.
The needs of passenger and freight railways
are so different that separation is likely the only solution. Of course,
passenger trains and freight trains can still share tracks in many places, especially
on low-density long distance passenger routes, but major passenger corridors
should be separated from major freight routes so that they can be optimized for
their respective users. Fortunately, the advent of intermodal shipping means
that only a core of freight network is required; instead of picking up a few
cars at each shipper, much freight traffic is now delivered by trucks to a
relative handful of intermodal terminals. North America benefits from its
legacy of competing private railways, which produced multiple parallel
corridors that can now be divided between passengers and freight. The Amtrak-owned
Northeast Corridor has almost no freight traffic, as there is a parallel corridor
owned by the freight railways and dedicated to their trains. Europe needs to
embark on the arduous project of clearing a core network for heavy freight cars
and double-stacked intermodal containers, likely after shifting most passenger
trains to new high-speed lines.
Running a decent regional rail system in a
North American city will require the exclusion of most freight trains from
regional rail tracks. Local customers can have freight cars picked up and
dropped off at night, when regional trains are not operating, but through freight
traffic should use dedicated tracks. Especially for high-speed lines, the
problems posed by North American heavy freight on track superelevation, track wear,
platform height, and collision safety are too problematic for extensive track sharing.
(More in future posts on sharing between freight and CityRail) Fortunately, many cities including Toronto have already shifted most of their
freight rail traffic to bypass routes in the suburbs. Toronto’s main intermodal
terminals are in Brampton and Vaughan and there are relatively few directly
served industrial customers in the city centre. The Barrie and Stouffville lines,
and most of the Richmond Hill, Lakeshore and Kitchener lines, have very little
through freight traffic. The Milton line and segments of other routes would
simply require separate tracks for freight traffic, either in the same corridor
or on a new parallel route. Most freight traffic in the GTA would not interact
with CityRail at all, while separating the two track users where they do
interact would not be an insurmountable task.
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
CityRail In Depth: Corridor Capacity
Toronto is facing a transportation crisis. We have more people using every form of transportation than any of the systems were designed to accommodate. Our best chance to expand rapid transit throughout the GTA for the smallest price is to add a new level of train service, referred to here as CityRail. This is the second in a series of in depth articles exploring aspects of CityRail.
This article is shared with Urban Toronto.
This article defines an ultimate scenario for various rail services in the Greater Toronto Area. It will explore rail corridor capacity to accommodate the maximum foreseeable level of CityRail service without excluding other corridor users. Using conservative assumptions based on international standards and a modern signalling system, it is clear that an extremely high level of service can be accommodated with a relatively limited expansion of the existing physical infrastructure. CityRail doesn't need billions of dollars of big infrastructure projects. In fact, it could be implemented with a handful of small targeted projects combined with the improvements Metrolinx is already undertaking.
This post assumes the establishment of three distinct levels of service, which mirrors most European systems. Within urban areas, there is a high frequency and frequent-stop rapid-transit-style service (such as the S-Bahn in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, and the RER in France), which would be CityRail in Toronto. It would run roughly to the edge of the developed urban area while towns and cities beyond would be served by a regional express service operating at lower frequency, like the RegionalBahn trains in Germany and TER in France. In Toronto, these trains would have on-board comfort similar to existing GO trains and would make only major station stops out to Niagara, Barrie, Kitchener, Cobourg, and perhaps Peterborough. An interesting option could be the provision of two service classes, with second class similar to GO and first class more like VIA, with reclining seats and food service. The final level of service is InterCity or high-speed service, which would offer a VIA Rail level of comfort and on-board service and be geared to passengers travelling distances greater than 100km. CityRail and the Regional Express services directly complement each other, with the former providing high-frequency and high-capacity for shorter trips while the latter provides the comfort and speed desired by passengers travelling longer distances. No single type of rail service could adequately serve all of Southern Ontario, but three levels of service will permit frequent stops and short headways for people travelling shorter distance while retaining comfort desired by longer-distance riders.
CityRail assumes the installation of a communication-based train control (CBTC) system in all corridors. CBTC uses modern wireless technology to keep track of exactly where trains are at all times. Rather than simply defining large sections of track that can only be occupied by one train at a time and notifying train drivers by signal lights, it can constantly maintain a safe space around each train that varies depending on the stopping distance required by each train at its current speed. It can greatly increase capacity on a line compared with current technology, particularly when different trains have different stopping requirements. It’s also a major safety improvement, since it makes absolutely sure that no two trains occupy the same track at the same time, and can even automatically stop an errant train without any intervention by its driver. Following a serious commuter rail crash in Los Angeles, the U.S. Congress has mandated that all American passenger rail corridors be equipped with such a system by December 2015. A state-of-the-art signalling system is the best way to add capacity to a rail network without spending vast sums on more tracks.
Adopting a signalling system that is compatible with the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) standard is by far the best option for CityRail. European countries have spent billions of dollars developing this most advanced signalling standard. Better yet, it’s not exclusive to a single signalling system supplier; instead, all major suppliers have developed systems that are compatible with the standard. This means that components and future upgrades can be obtained from whichever supplier is most economical. Standard North American signalling systems have received far less research and development investment and have far fewer competitive suppliers. They are also far less capable, explaining the comparatively poor performance of North American heavy rail lines. Freight trains would not share tracks with CityRail trains, so there is no need for freight operators to install ERTMS equipment in most of their locomotives. For the relative handful of trains that serve local traffic in the City of Toronto, a small subfleet of ERTMS-equipped locomotives could be maintained. VIA Rail is a relatively small operator, so the cost of re-fitting its equipment would be comparatively small. For some trains, it might be possible to use electric ERTMS-equipped locomotives while they run through the GTA and then replace them with diesels at the last electrified station. Any potential high-speed line would use ERTMS-compatible signalling anyway. There is the potential for bugs which would need to be worked out in order to make ERTMS work in North America, but a major new signalling installation like CityRail should use the most capable and widely available international standard.
The diagram above describes an ultimate operating scenario in which CityRail is operating at high frequency on all corridors, while accommodating intercity, Regional Express, and Airport Rail Link services. This is meant to focus primarily on CityRail and is not meant to be an exhaustive or precise depiction of future rail service. For simplicity, it does not include the use of the North Toronto line nor services that run less than once an hour. I have assumed a relatively conservative maximum capacity of 24 trains per hour per direction on dedicated CityRail tracks (roughly every two and a half minutes) and 12 trains per hour (every five minutes) on other passenger tracks. For comparison, the busiest section of the RER accommodates over 30 trains per hour (less than two minutes apart), while the Munich S-Bahn tunnel handles 30. Crossrail in London will operate with 24 trains per hour per direction when it opens, expandable to 32. Some intercity corridors operate with even closer headways. While changes to regulations and operating practices will be necessary, the laws of physics are not different in Paris, so it is possible to run regional rail trains at high frequency in Toronto.
The main constraints on train frequency are the signalling system, train braking distance, train acceleration, dwell time at stations, and the need for fast trains to overtake slower trains. The installation of ERTMS would eliminate all signalling constraints. Train braking distance and acceleration would be greatly improved by operating lighter, more modern, electrified European standard trains, particularly for CityRail. It could be more problematic on non-CityRail tracks where VIA and other trains must share the corridor, which is why I have assumed a more generous 5 minute minimum headway. Dwell time at stations can be mitigated by rolling stock that is designed for rapid transit operation, with many doors and high floors. The Spanish Solution, involving a platform on both sides of the train so all doors can be used, is another option. At some stations, a two-track corridor could expand into four platform tracks so that a following train could pull into a parallel track as the one ahead is departing. Finally, the need to overtake is not so severe within the City of Toronto as frequent-stop CityRail trains will be in their own corridor separate from express trains. Regional Express, intercity and Airport Rail Link trains could all travel at the same speed through the city. Any conflict between non-stop intercity trains and stopping Regional Express trains could be resolved with passing tracks at stations. Changes to operating practices and regulations, combined with careful scheduling, will permit high frequency rapid-transit-style service on all CityRail corridors without requiring a massive investment in more track.
Lakeshore, Milton, Kitchener, and Stouffville (as they are currently named) are the CityRail corridors with the highest demand potential given the relatively dense areas and high-capacity connecting routes they serve. Richmond Hill, Bolton, and Barrie have somewhat lower potential given that they either closely parallel existing rapid transit routes or pass though relatively inaccessible or lightly developed areas for much of their length. I have therefore assumed a very substantial ultimate CityRail service of every 5 minutes on the former group and every 10 minutes on the latter. At the outset, trains would likely run at half as often. Lakeshore, Kitchener, and Barrie would also see up to 2 Regional Express trains per hour. The Kitchener corridor would have a separate pair of tracks for its Regional Express services, which would be shared with 4 Airport Rail Link trains per hour and two intercity or high-speed trains. The Lakeshore would also have a dedicated pair of tracks for Regional Express, intercity and high-speed services. As considerably more CityRail trains would be operating on the west side of the city than on the east, those trains would need a place to turn. Rather than carrying out that relatively time-consuming process at Union Station, the most valuable real estate in the city, I propose that it be done at a station on the site of the existing GO Don Yard at Cherry Street. There is ample space there for multiple platforms to turn trains, with the added benefit of serving the new West Don Lands and Port Lands developments. Toronto's rail network, with targeted improvements, can accommodate even a very high level of rail service.
The infrastructure expansion that would be required in the City of Toronto to provide even this extremely extensive ultimate level of service is relatively small. It would likely include:
- Building a dedicated pair of CityRail tracks in the CP Galt Sub (GO Milton) corridor.
- Expanding the Weston corridor to 4 tracks north of the Junction and 6 tracks south, which is already approved in the current Metrolinx EA.
- Expanding Lakeshore East to 4 tracks.
- Providing a continuous pair of tracks on the Stouffville, Richmond Hill, Barrie, and Bolton corridors.
- Flying (grade-separated) junction where the Bolton and Barrie lines enter the Kitchener/Milton corridor, and where Stouffville enters the Lakeshore corridor.
- A grade separation between the Milton corridor and the Kitchener intercity/ARL tracks.
- The re-alignment of tracks through the Union Station Rail Corridor to eliminate the need for different lines to cross and unnecessary switching.
- The addition of simple surface stations along all routes to serve dense development and major connecting bus, subway, and streetcar routes.
- A station complex at Cherry Street to turn and service trains.
- Electrification of all corridors.
Many of the improvements that would be required for the introduction of CityRail are already being built or planned by Metrolinx. However, their true potential is only unlocked with modern electrified, multiple unit rolling stock and advanced signalling systems. None of the projects listed above require lengthy underground construction or new corridors. In fact, almost all of it can easily be accommodated in the existing GO corridors. CityRail would add hundreds of kilometres of rapid transit to the GTA without needing to bore a single tunnel. The only needed physical plant is simple surface stations, selective grade separations, new tracks in existing corridors, and electrification. These are comparatively simple and inexpensive projects by the standards of rapid transit. The GTA is blessed with an extensive network of rail corridors, and if used to their full potential through the implementation of CityRail, they could greatly enhance transit service throughout the region.
Monday, August 20, 2012
CityRail In Depth: Union Station
This is the first in a series of CityRail In Depth articles, which explore detailed aspects of the CityRail concept and rail service in the Greater Toronto Area. This article is shared with Urban Toronto.
Union Station is the critical point on any regional rail system in Toronto. All corridors funnel through Union, and its location ensures that it will remain by far the busiest station for the foreseeable future. While the beauty of its Great Hall is enduring, if tarnished, the 'business end' of the station—the actual tracks and platforms—was built in 1927 for a very different set of operating practices from modern regional rail.
Union Station is currently undergoing a major renovation project. Passengers will see big changes when it is complete, including the addition of a whole floor of shopping under the station. The main improvement to rail service is the long-overdue addition of many more stairways to the platforms, including a new west side York Street concourse in parallel to the current GO concourse at Bay Street to the east side.
| Union Station Revitalization Section, image courtesy of the City of Toronto |
The original station included few platform access points: two staircases from the current VIA departures concourse and another pair from the parallel exit concourses. The GO concourse was added to provide several more stair access points to some tracks. The platforms themselves are low, unlike Montreal Central Station, Penn Station in New York, or virtually all stations in Europe; this means that passengers must climb steps to reach the car level, which dramatically increases the time required to board and unload trains and makes boarding much more difficult for passengers in wheelchairs. The renovation project will solve most of the problems of limited platform access and poor station circulation, but it will do nothing to improve the problems related to platform width and height.
The Union Station rail corridor has also recently been rebuilt, more-or-less to its original 1927 layout, with the addition of a fly-under to the west of the station. Trains are forced to slow down as they go through many switches. Awkward operating practices compound the problem: running the Airport Rail Link to platform track 1 will force it to cross many other lines at grade, reducing capacity and reliability on all routes. GO Trains dwell for a very long time at the station compared to most international railways, which is the main limitation on capacity. The major causes are the large size of the trains coupled with the relatively few doors per car, which means trains take a long time to load and unload. This is compounded by the low platforms, narrow platforms, and relatively few access points. Most international regional rail systems runthrough trains, which means that they don’t occupy valuable space at the busiest station in the system as they carry out the procedures required to turn the train. These procedures are also much more onerous in North America than in Europe, including the requirement for a time consuming brake test every time the train is turned.
| Union Station Glass Atrium and Bush Shed Renovation, image courtesy of GO Transit |
Current Planning
Metrolinx explored these capacity issues in the recent Union 2031 study (helpfully provided by Steve Munro’s blog). It examines a number of scenarios and possible changes to the station to enhance its capacity. While it is admirable that Metrolinx is looking to the future, it is unfortunate that the study wasn’t conducted before the current revitalization project began. That would have allowed the project to incorporate more improvements to train operations, in addition to aesthetic and commercial upgrades. While useful, the study includes some very questionable assumptions. Foremost among them is the establishment of five minutes as the absolute minimum dwell time possible, even for a through train (turning trains would require ten minutes). There is no explanation of how this was derived, and it is far higher than standard international practice, where trains dwell at stations far busier than Union for times consistently measured in seconds. This assumption colours the entire study and makes the station appear far more constrained than it is by international standards. As an extreme comparison, it handles about 200,000 passengers per day on 15 tracks, while Tokyo’s Shinjuku JR Station handles over 1.5 million per day on 14 tracks. Paris’ Châtelet-Les Halles station on the RER handles half a million riders per day on only seven tracks.
In the short-to-medium term, the Metrolinx study reasonably deems the current arrangement acceptable once platform access improvements are complete. In the much longer term, it looks at several major capital expenditures that would provide an additional pair of tracks underground, but that’s a costly project when Union is nowhere near international standards of capacity. An even madder scheme would dead-end Georgetown and Milton lines at Bathurst North, destroying the possibility of an interconnected regional rail system once and for all. Other cities, like Paris, Munich, and London, have spent or are spending billions to correct the mistake of separate stations on regional rail routes. It would be a truly baffling step backwards for Toronto to go in the other direction. Fortunately, despite the press that such schemes have received, Metrolinx doesn’t believe that any of these changes will be required any time soon.
| Union Station Revitalization, Shed and Atrium Section, image courtesy of the City of Toronto |
Potential Solutions
There are several options for modifying Union’s platform arrangement to enhance capacity.
The international standard is for platforms that are far wider than those at Union. It could be possible to create reasonably wide platforms by shifting the tracks into the space now occupied by the baggage platform. While a seemingly simple solution, it runs into difficulty as columns currently run from directly beneath the current tracks down to bedrock. The tracks cannot simply be moved without finding new ways to support the weight of trains. Shifting the columns would have been a very good idea, given that builders are already in the process of digging out the entire underside of the station, including completely removing and rebuilding the columns. Unfortunately such a plan was not included in a retail- rather than transportation-focused Union revitalization.
| Union Station Revitalization Column Replacement, image courtesy of the City of Toronto |
There may be other options for shifting the tracks while keeping the columns in their present position. For example, steel beams could run beneath the tracks, connecting the columns and carrying the weight of trains onto the adjacent two columns. Chicago has recently developed a capacity enhancement strategy for its own Union Station. It has a very similar platform arrangement to Toronto’s Union, and its planners propose widening its passenger platforms by eliminating the baggage platforms. If a new means of supporting the tracks is possible, this is the simplest solution and would produce standard island platforms of reasonable width.
An even bolder option for CityRail would involve the removal of tracks (numbered from the North) 2, 3, 5 and 7. This would provide four tracks and extremely wide platforms in a “Spanish Solution.” Though the number of platform tracks used by CityRail would be reduced, the arrangement would be comparable to stations like Chatelet-Les Halles in Paris, which moves far more passengers than Union in a CityRail-type of system. A new, detailed circulation study of these options would be necessary to determine which would provide the highest passenger throughput and closest headways. It needs to be done on the basis of international standards, without including strange assumptions like the five-minute minimum dwell time.Issues of corridor and track capacity will be examined further in an upcoming CityRail In Depth article.
Any real improvement to the platform and track arrangement at Union would likely require the removal of the Bush trainshed, which is the roof covering the track area. The central portion is currently being removed and replaced with a high glass roof, while the remainder is being preserved as a heritage structure. The Bush design was a fairly common and utilitarian approach to covering tracks that was popular in the pre-war period. It has historic significance, but it is far from the last of its kind. The Bush shed makes it difficult to change the track arrangement, raise platforms to the level of train doors, and accommodate overhead catenary for electrification. It also creates a dank and uncomfortable setting for passengers to wait for their trains. Union Station is a very important piece of transportation infrastructure in the GTA It may be necessary to sacrifice the trainshed, just as it was necessary to sacrifice the architecturally significant Terminal One in order to modernize and expand Pearson Airport. Unlike Terminal One, it should be feasible to dismantle the trainshed and move it to another location in the city, where it could be repurposed into something like the Wychwood Art Barns.
| Union Station Revitalization Bush Shed Green Roof and Glass Atrium, image courtesy of GO Transit |
Union Station is the linchpin of any regional rail system in the Greater Toronto Area. CityRail requires a reasonable track and platform arrangement at Union in order to function reliably and offer high capacity. There are many options to improve the station without the need for drastic measures like separate underground platforms, so Union should be able to function well as the hub of CityRail for the foreseeable future without a total rebuild.
Friday, July 6, 2012
The CityRail Concept: Real Regional Rail for the GTA (Updated)
This article is shared with Urban Toronto.
The introduction of genuine regional rail in the GTA would be the most revolutionary transit improvement in the region since the opening of the original subway in 1954. Toronto woefully underuses its comprehensive network of rail corridors connecting all of its suburbs with the central city and with each other. Right now, most corridors see about a dozen mammoth trains a day shuttling commuters from vast parking fields to downtown office buildings. Regional rail is an entirely different type of service in the same corridors, more akin to a subway or other rapid transit line than to locomotive-hauled GO bi-levels. There are several key characteristics that define regional rail: frequent service all day and every day; full fare integration and seamless connections with local transit; and electrified multiple unit trains that allow fast acceleration and frequent stops.
THE CITYRAIL CONCEPT
Genuine regional rail will not occur as a result of piecemeal improvement of existing GO service. It must be developed through a comprehensive plan that guides all of the improvements required to achieve a desired standard of service: the CityRail concept. GO currently adds trains as demand requires and as freight railways permit. This is fine for a commuter service, but it’s not how rapid transit works. Imagine if the TTC cut back service on the subway to every half hour on Sundays because the trains weren’t running full. CityRail establishes the goal of real rapid transit service throughout the GTA and describes the necessary infrastructure improvements that will be required to achieve it. This clear final product makes the promotion of the concept much easier for transit agencies, both to the general public and to higher levels of government.
The initial CityRail concept involves the creation of rapid transit lines in all of the existing GO Transit rail corridors out to the edge of the urban area. Riders on CityRail lines will enjoy a minimum standard of service on all lines.
The introduction of genuine regional rail in the GTA would be the most revolutionary transit improvement in the region since the opening of the original subway in 1954. Toronto woefully underuses its comprehensive network of rail corridors connecting all of its suburbs with the central city and with each other. Right now, most corridors see about a dozen mammoth trains a day shuttling commuters from vast parking fields to downtown office buildings. Regional rail is an entirely different type of service in the same corridors, more akin to a subway or other rapid transit line than to locomotive-hauled GO bi-levels. There are several key characteristics that define regional rail: frequent service all day and every day; full fare integration and seamless connections with local transit; and electrified multiple unit trains that allow fast acceleration and frequent stops.
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| CityRail Plan, cartography by Craig White |
THE CITYRAIL CONCEPT
Genuine regional rail will not occur as a result of piecemeal improvement of existing GO service. It must be developed through a comprehensive plan that guides all of the improvements required to achieve a desired standard of service: the CityRail concept. GO currently adds trains as demand requires and as freight railways permit. This is fine for a commuter service, but it’s not how rapid transit works. Imagine if the TTC cut back service on the subway to every half hour on Sundays because the trains weren’t running full. CityRail establishes the goal of real rapid transit service throughout the GTA and describes the necessary infrastructure improvements that will be required to achieve it. This clear final product makes the promotion of the concept much easier for transit agencies, both to the general public and to higher levels of government.
The initial CityRail concept involves the creation of rapid transit lines in all of the existing GO Transit rail corridors out to the edge of the urban area. Riders on CityRail lines will enjoy a minimum standard of service on all lines.
- CityRail would have trains at least every 15 minutes from morning until late night every day, including weekends, so that riders can go to a station without consulting a schedule and know that a train will arrive shortly. This allows the system to be used as a rapid transit backbone in both Toronto and the 905 suburban municipalities.
- CityRail services would have fully integrated fares with local transit service. Riders would transfer to and from CityRail as seamlessly as they currently do between TTC subways and buses. Fares would be the same for a given trip regardless of the mode chosen. Local transit routes would be routed into regional rail stations as they currently are to subway stations.
- CityRail trains would be operated with electric multiple units that produce no air emissions and accelerate far more rapidly than existing GO Trains, permitting frequent rapid-transit-style stops without longer travel times than GO services.
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