The O-Train Model: Affordable Rail Transit for North America

Source: JVL Photography (www.jvlphoto.com)

We’ve become accustomed in recent years to the idea that even modest rail transit projects cost hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. But there’s a model right here in Ontario that shows that high quality rail transit can be developed for a small fraction of that cost. Ottawa’s O-Train uses off-the-shelf German railcars to provide fast and reliable trains every 15 minutes. It’s 8km long, has five stations, and is grade-separated so that it never has to wait for turning cars or red lights. And all of it was built for $21 million dollars, the cost of less than a kilometre of Toronto on-street LRT.

How did Ottawa manage to develop a high quality rail transit service for so little money? It starts with using an existing lightly used freight rail corridor that provided a useful north-south route across the city through Carleton University. Another key was defining it as a “pilot project”, so it was exempted from out-dated regulations and didn’t require years of multi-million dollar studies before construction could begin. Rather than buying custom-made trains like most projects in North America, no matter how small, they bought off-the-shelf Talent trains that had been proven in widespread use in Germany. Finally, rather than building elaborate multi-million dollar stations, they either adapted existing Transitway stations or built a simple asphalt platform with an ordinary bus shelter. This focus on simplicity, ease of construction, and off-the-shelf equipment allowed the project to be built in a fraction of the time and at a tiny fraction of the cost of normal North American rail transit projects.

The possibilities opened up by the order-of-magnitude lower price per kilometre of an O-Train-style project are immense. Smaller cities and even rural areas can enjoy quality rail rapid transit if they have an existing rail corridor that provides a useful route. For example, Cambridge—currently excluded from the Waterloo Region LRT project—could be included with a route from Fairview Mall through Preston to Galt along the existing freight spur for a cost that would be a rounding error on the overall LRT project. With modest track work, Windsor could have a line from Devonshire Mall or Walkerville through the University of Windsor to Lasalle. These are just a few examples of small and mid-size cities that could easily afford rail transit if it comes at the price of a bus lane.

The O-Train model is also relevant for major cities on peripheral or suburban routes. In New York, this approach could be used to activate the Rockaway Beach branch for a fraction of the projected cost, or even (with some additional challenges) to build the TriboroRx. It can then be upgraded over time, as demand growth requires. The O-Train should be a model that is emulated throughout North America.

Reacting to the Neptis Big Move Transit Review

This article is shared with Urban Toronto.

Debates over Metrolinx's Big Move returned to the headlines this week with the release of a detailed new report prepared by planner Michael Schabas for the Neptis Foundation. While some observers may dismiss it as “yet another” study of transit in Toronto, we can never have too much information about a plan that will, after all, cost tens of billions of dollars. The report brings some useful and occasionally provocative suggestions to the table and also effectively criticizes some of the weakness of the GTA’s transit planning process. This article will examine some of Schabas’ conclusions.


Regional Rail and Fare Integration
I was extremely pleased to read a detailed assessment of the enormous benefits for reasonable cost that would be produced by real regional rail in Toronto. As Schabas effectively argues, Metrolinx’s GO electrification study was flawed as it concentrated on a mediocre and arbitrary 30-minute frequency that research demonstrates is inadequate to generate the massive ridership increase that comes from passengers not needing to rely on schedules, and because it insisted on the retention of massive 10-car bi-level trains. Both of these assumptions greatly limit the potential benefits of electric multiple unit operation. More importantly, the study did not consider the huge ridership that could be gained by allowing riders to pay the same fare to ride regional rail and local transit.  (More on fare integration in an upcoming article)

Schabas’ solution is to maintain a separate fleet of locomotive-hauled bi-levels for peak period service while using smaller electric multiple unit trains to maintain high frequency off-peak. While certainly a better approach than 30-minute infrequent bi-levels all day, it does not correspond with best practices on most real regional rail systems. They manage with a single fleet for peak and off-peak even with far higher ridership than Toronto. Many German S-Bahn systems, for example, move far more people than GO in the peak periods with single-level multiple units. They accomplish this through high frequency, just like the subway, which also moves far more people than GO. Bi-level cars may seem like a reasonable solution to add capacity, but in fact they are one of the biggest causes of capacity limitations on the system: because they take so long to unload at Union Station, headways are severely limited. With a better platform layout and EMU trains with no stairs and more doors per car to speed loading and unloading, frequencies of five minutes or better would be possible. Such a system would be able to move far more people in the peak period than even GO’s massive 12-car trains.

The benefits of EMUs go far beyond shorter headways and reduced emissions; a cutting-edge regional rail multiple unit like the Stadler FLIRT or comparable models from Bombardier would provide dramatic acceleration improvements over existing GO trains. A FLIRT making all stops from Hamilton, for example, would be as fast as existing GO trains from Hamilton running express after Oakville. This would permit the addition of more stops for rapid-transit-style service without sacrificing travel times. (The benefits of electrification will be examined in greater detail in a future article.)

Loco-hauled trains could be retained if necessary for longer distance trains to outlying cities like Kitchener or Barrie, which would likely be limited-stop services where acceleration is less important.

CityRail Plan central area, cartography by Craig White

The Downtown Relief Line
The Neptis report goes a bit astray when it examines the Downtown Relief Line. There is no question that real regional rail (not “GO Trains,” as has been reported in the media) would provide significant relief to the subway system. However, that is only one of the many benefits of the DRL.
The DRL would be extremely useful even in the context of CityRail because it would provide service to riders in the few areas that aren’t particularly well served by regional rail. Schabas suggests that riders on the Danforth line could easily transfer to regional rail at Main Street, but that connection is in reality quite awkward. Given that passengers would be required to walk considerably further than the Spadina station connection between Bloor and YUS lines, it is likely that relatively few people would choose it over continuing to transfer at Bloor-Yonge.

The effect on the Yonge Line north of Bloor would also be limited. Most riders on the line, which will become increasingly overcrowded as it is extended north, transfer from connecting bus routes from the east. These riders would switch en masse to a Don Mills extension of the DRL, dramatically reducing congestion on Yonge and providing much better service to riders in that part of the city. Unlike the Georgetown corridor, for example, regional rail in the Richmond Hill corridor would not connect very effectively with surface routes because of its deep valley location.

Finally, the DRL serves some of the fastest-developing parts of the city. The waterfront, East Bayfront, Portlands, Cityplace, and Leslieville areas are all seeing massive growth and development. Furthermore, it serves areas where existing transit service is slow and unreliable. It could reverse the significant ridership declines that the east-west downtown streetcar routes have suffered over the past two decades.

The Downtown Relief Line, map by Christopher Livett

The key problem with the cost/benefit case for the DRL as evaluated in the Neptis report is the extraordinarily high cost estimate provided by Metrolinx. The most striking feature of almost all transit planning reports over the past decade is the complete absence of attention to cost control. Very few studies include an examination of different approaches (i.e. underground vs. elevated) or routes and the cost implications. This is in stark contrast with earlier reports, such as the original 1985 Downtown Relief Line study, in which cost was the primary factor being considered when different routes were evaluated. That report concluded that the most economical routing would be along the rail corridor from Bay Street to the Don River, where vacant land is available for a subway. The cost savings would surely be dramatic since virtually no new infrastructure beyond tracks and surface stations would be required in that segment. It would have the added benefit of running right through the heart of the rapidly developing East Bayfront and West Don Lands areas. Such a route does not appear to have been considered in the contemporary DRL reports. The Don Mills segment, as well, is planned to be built entirely underground even though an elevated routing through that area would clearly be feasible and would likely produce enormous cost savings (See "The Rising Cost of Rapid Transit Construction" for more detail). Underground construction costs in Toronto are becoming increasingly out-of-line when compared with peer cities both in Canada and Europe.

Schabas uncovers a particularly striking case of inattention to costs in the Scarborough rapid transit Benefits Case Assessment:
 “TTC seems to be requiring a fairly elaborate and expensive yard. The BCA (which was prepared by consultants) notes, ‘The cost of a Vancouver facility with comparable capacity was roughly $200m lower, although the yard alignment and maintenance practices differ from the TTC’s.’ If Metrolinx thinks there may be the opportunity to save $200 million, surely it should give this more attention than a short footnote?” (60)


Automated Light Metro
Certainly one of the most provocative elements of the Neptis report is its advocacy for automated light metro. While the technology has been extremely popular and successfully implemented around the world, in cities as varied as Copenhagen, Paris, London, Vancouver, Tokyo, Moscow, and Madrid, debates about transit in Toronto have remained rigidly within the subway vs. light rail framework.
Part of the blame for the technology falling out of fashion in Toronto comes from the Scarborough RT, which is the only example of automated light metro in the GTA (though the TTC chooses to have an operator in the cab). This is a poor example of the technology, however, that should not discredit an entire approach to transit. Automated light metro does not need to rely on a proprietary technology like the RT with its complicated and sometimes problematic linear induction propulsion system. At its simplest, automated light metro is just a driverless, fully grade-separated train that is lighter and quieter than the subway to facilitate elevated operation when desired.

The Neptis report illustrates a number of significant benefits to the Automated Light Metro technology. Its operating costs over the long term are significantly lower than non-grade-separated light rail since it does not require a driver. The lack of a driver also makes it possible to run shorter trains at maximum frequency all the time for no additional cost. This is a major benefit on less busy routes where the need for a driver could result in unreasonably long waits for passengers. Vehicle costs, in many cases, are also lower than for LRT at a given passenger capacity. Schabas makes the case fairly effectively that automated light metro would be suitable for the Eglinton line, providing faster trips, better frequencies, and greater reliability. Altogether, he persuasively argues that it would provide a significantly better cost/benefit ratio over the long term than the existing LRT plan.

The Neptis report also underplays the enormous importance of transfers from feeder buses in providing the high ridership that makes Toronto’s existing suburban rapid transit so successful. The large majority of riders at Toronto’s suburban subway stations don’t walk to the station from the surrounding neighbourhood; instead, they arrive by bus. There has not been much study about whether bus riders will transfer to a surface LRT that only offers, according to Metrolinx, about 25% faster trips than a bus. This is of critical importance on Eglinton, since if passengers on north-south bus routes decide to stay on the bus until they reach the Danforth line, rather than transferring to the Eglinton Crosstown, it would make the justification of the multi-billion dollar project much weaker.

Vancouver's Canada Line, image by Michael Berry from Wikipedia

The Canada Line in Vancouver is an excellent example of an automated light metro line with a comparable capacity and length to the Eglinton Crosstown line (more on this subject here). It is, however, completely grade-separated and so will offer a considerably faster and more reliable trip than a surface LRT that faces obstruction from traffic lights. It is also fully automated, permitting higher frequencies and lower operating costs, particularly off-peak. Built as a public-private partnership, it cost governments $2.5 billion—less than half of the Eglinton Crosstown—and was completed in time for the 2010 Olympics as planned.

Of course, all of these points assume that redesigning the Eglinton line yet again is desirable. Certainly, it would do nothing to dispel the image of disarray that has surrounded many recent Toronto transit projects. It could also bring significant cancellation costs, though they might be reduced if Bombardier is retained to produce the vehicles for the redesigned line. While it is difficult to argue with Schabas when he says that this project will be with us for decades so it should be built right, there are significant costs to halting and redesigning the project yet again and the risk of the useful project falling through entirely is very real.

Lack of Foresight at LaGuardia

While this post isn't exactly transit related, broader planning practices on major North American infrastructure projects provide valuable context. LaGuardia Airport is the dominant short haul airport in the New York area. Its existing Central Terminal Building was completed in 1964 and is both dilapidated and severely overcrowded. After many years of discussion, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has decided to build the long-overdue replacement. The details are discussed in the project briefing book, but one element stands out as potentially problematic.  The large majority of gates in the new terminal building are designed for Boeing 737/Airbus A320-sized narrowbody aircraft, which along with regional jets make up the overwhelming majority of short haul flights in North America.

In the 1970s, however, far larger aircraft were used on short-haul routes, and the widebody DC-10 was designed specifically to fit at LaGuardia. In order to permit airlines to operate some larger aircraft, planners chose to design a handful of gates for Aircraft Design Group IV, which includes the Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft that airlines might choose to operate. So far, so good. The problem is that no Group IV aircraft has been designed in decades. The Boeing 757 and 767 are no longer being produced for airlines and their replacements, such as the Boeing 787 and Airbus A330, have considerably longer wingspans, causing them to be categorized in Design Group V. By the time the LaGuardia Airport expansion is complete, there aren’t likely to be many Design Group IV aircraft operating, and those that are will be fast approaching retirement. These gates will be essentially useless the day they open, as the larger aircraft for which they were intended will not fit and smaller aircraft will be able to use the other Group III gates. While this problem will hopefully be caught by the time detailed plans are drawn, it is not a particularly auspicious sign for the success of the project, and is perhaps a sign of why so many large infrastructure projects require costly mid-construction re-designs.

The Rising Cost of Rapid Transit Construction

This post is shared with Urban Toronto.

Nearly every North American who travels to Europe returns with awe at the extent of their subway and intercity rail networks. Part of the explanation for their vastly more impressive infrastructure is greater investment, but another large part comes from a cost of construction that is often a fraction of that in many cities on this side of the Atlantic. The Province of Ontario has invested an unprecedented amount of money in transit as part of its MoveOntario 2020 program, but Toronto is getting far less than other cities have built with similar funding. Transit capital costs have been rising at multiples of consumer price inflation for decades and if that course continues, major transit projects will become unaffordable no matter how generous the government of the day.

The Inflation Problem
The existing Sheppard subway was criticized at the time for its high cost relative to previous projects. The 5.5km line opened in 2002 and cost less than $1 billion including a complex interchange at Yonge. Rob Ford’s recently proposed plan to complete the line from Downsview to Scarborough Centre would add 12.7 km of tunnel for a cost estimated by the TTC at $4.7 billion. That is an increase from $172 million per kilometre on the original project to $370 million projected for the current extension project, not including the seemingly inevitable escalations once detailed planning and construction begin. If subway construction costs had been held to CPI inflation, construction today should cost $221 million per kilometre.

The comparison with CPI inflation is not entirely fair, as various elements of construction, particularly energy intensive materials like concrete, have seen significant price increases. Nevertheless, continuing on a path of steady increases far above CPI inflation is not sustainable. The recent project’s planning studies alone were expected to cost $250 million to $300 million, close to a third the cost of the entire original Sheppard project, before a single shovel hits the dirt.

International Comparisons
Subway construction costs differ to a remarkable degree between cities, even within countries or economic areas. Torontonians searching for a city that spends more than their own need to look no further than New York, which holds the dubious distinction of most expensive construction costs in the world. The tiny 2.4km Second Avenue subway project is costing more than $4.5 billion, or $1.875 billion per kilometre. Many reasons have been cited, ranging from the catch-all of New York’s "uniqueness" to unusually difficult construction conditions. More probable explanations include byzantine union work rules and even the open secret of Mafia involvement in the New York construction industry. But just because New York does it worse than Toronto doesn’t mean that many cities don’t do it better.

The most often cited example of cheap subway construction is Spain. The most recent Madrid Metro extension cost $84 million per kilometre. There are differences from the Toronto subway, including single tunnel bores and somewhat smaller trains, but the differences are not fundamental to the operation of the system and certainly do not justify a four-fold difference in cost. Lest readers question whether passengers are forced to board trains in dank caves, many Spanish subway stations were designed by celebrated international architects, including Norman Foster. It is not decoration and design that add significantly to the cost of a station. Instead, it is the choice to build deep caverns and vast mezzanines, along with project management and other ancillary costs. Though not a subway tunnel, Barcelona was able to build a 5.8km high-speed rail tunnel running directly beneath the streets of the city centre, including a complex underpinning of Gaudi's Sagrada Familia, for €179.3 million (C$222 million).

A Madrid Metro station. Source: FCC Construction 

Other cities are more expensive than Madrid and Barcelona, but they are still far more economical than Toronto. The U5 extension in Berlin, for example, is costing about C$242 million per kilometre despite being built around multiple existing routes and through the most densely built part of the city, a far more challenging setting than Sheppard or Vaughan. The Paris Metro Line 14, opened between 1998 and 2003, was also built through the historic heart of the city; it cost about $173 million per kilometre.

We do not have to go to Europe to see substantial cost differences. The Montreal Metro extension to Laval was built from 2002 to 2007 and cost $143.2 million per kilometre, including a river crossing and fairly lavish stations. Though its trains are somewhat smaller, that difference surely doesn't justify a doubling of costs down the 401. The Canada Line in Vancouver cost $107.9 million per kilometre. It is fully grade separated and automated, the majority of the line is underground, and it includes two major water crossings. By contrast, the Eglinton Crosstown line is only partially grade-separated, including long sections where it is little more than dedicated lanes in the middle of the street. Despite its substantially lower standard of construction, it is costing more than two-and-a-half times as much per kilometre.

De la Concorde Station, Montreal Metro. Source: IBI Group

Potential Savings
The Canada Line is an excellent example of a completely different approach to rapid transit construction. Rather than being managed by the local transit organization, which may or may not have recent experience with similar major projects, it was built in by a private consortium with substantial international experience that consortium designed, built, and continues to operate the line. It was a successful example of a public-private partnership (many are not so successful), particularly because the private partner was responsible for most cost increases and was therefore very inclined to limit costs.

Some cost reductions are not without impact. The most infamous case in Vancouver was the long underground section along Cambie Street. The businesses on the street suffered for several years as the street was dug up using the somewhat more disruptive, but significantly cheaper, cut-and-cover method of construction. This was the method used to build the original Yonge and Bloor lines, but it has since fallen out of favour in this city. While a long section of dug-up street could be very harmful to the many businesses along the street in the downtown core, it would be much less problematic on many of Toronto’s broad suburban streets. A possible mitigation effort would be to develop better compensation arrangements in advance that would sustain businesses for the duration of construction.

In suburban Richmond, the Canada Line is elevated. This is another approach that was frequently used in earlier decades in Toronto, but has since been almost completely shunned. The York-Vaughan subway extension is a perfect example. The TTC is using expensive tunnel boring machines to dig deep tunnels under largely empty land. Certainly the section north of Steeles could have been built above ground for a massive cost saving. Many suburban business centres, like Scarborough Centre and Metrotown in Burnaby, are built around elevated transit lines. If the buildings were designed from the outset to accommodate elevated rapid transit, there is no reason why it should have been detrimental to the new Vaughan Metropolitan Centre. In fact, an elevated alignment was briefly examined in the TTC’s study, but it refused to consider an above-ground VCC station and therefore dismissed the resulting grades as inconvenient for operations. The study did not even include a cost estimate so that the savings could be balanced against the costs. The Sheppard extension to Scarborough is another place where a partially elevated alignment could result in substantial economies.

Elevated lines are out of the question on pedestrian-oriented downtown streets, but many of Toronto’s suburban arterials simply do not fit that description. Many are lined with the back fences of homes or distant set back buildings. They would see minimal aesthetic impact from an elevated line. 

A Canada Line elevated section in Richmond. Source: 24h Vancouver 

This is a subject that I will be returning to in much greater detail in the future. Doing a detailed examination of why Toronto’s costs are so much higher than those in other major developed-world cities would require detailed analysis of major project budgets, a task that would require a team of experts. Toronto’s current mayor prides himself on his penny-pinching reputation. This is a place where real action on cost control could make a major difference, both to the city’s budget and, more importantly, to the possibility of further rapid transit construction in the future. Instead of taking cost estimates at face value, governments and citizens must seriously examine why they have risen so rapidly and whether they can be reduced.

Comparative Approximate Costs of Subway Construction (in 2012 Canadian Dollars) 

• New York (Second Avenue Subway): $1.875 billion/km
• Toronto (Proposed Sheppard Subway Extension): $370 million/km
• Toronto (Spadina-York Extension): $302 million/km
• Berlin (U5 Extension): $242 million/km
• Paris (Line 14): $234 million/km
• Montreal (Laval Metro Extension): $163 million/km
• Vancouver (Canada Line): $117 million/km
• Madrid (Line 2 Extension to Las Rosas): $89 million/km