The O-Train Model: Affordable Rail Transit for North America

Source: JVL Photography (www.jvlphoto.com)

We’ve become accustomed in recent years to the idea that even modest rail transit projects cost hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. But there’s a model right here in Ontario that shows that high quality rail transit can be developed for a small fraction of that cost. Ottawa’s O-Train uses off-the-shelf German railcars to provide fast and reliable trains every 15 minutes. It’s 8km long, has five stations, and is grade-separated so that it never has to wait for turning cars or red lights. And all of it was built for $21 million dollars, the cost of less than a kilometre of Toronto on-street LRT.

How did Ottawa manage to develop a high quality rail transit service for so little money? It starts with using an existing lightly used freight rail corridor that provided a useful north-south route across the city through Carleton University. Another key was defining it as a “pilot project”, so it was exempted from out-dated regulations and didn’t require years of multi-million dollar studies before construction could begin. Rather than buying custom-made trains like most projects in North America, no matter how small, they bought off-the-shelf Talent trains that had been proven in widespread use in Germany. Finally, rather than building elaborate multi-million dollar stations, they either adapted existing Transitway stations or built a simple asphalt platform with an ordinary bus shelter. This focus on simplicity, ease of construction, and off-the-shelf equipment allowed the project to be built in a fraction of the time and at a tiny fraction of the cost of normal North American rail transit projects.

The possibilities opened up by the order-of-magnitude lower price per kilometre of an O-Train-style project are immense. Smaller cities and even rural areas can enjoy quality rail rapid transit if they have an existing rail corridor that provides a useful route. For example, Cambridge—currently excluded from the Waterloo Region LRT project—could be included with a route from Fairview Mall through Preston to Galt along the existing freight spur for a cost that would be a rounding error on the overall LRT project. With modest track work, Windsor could have a line from Devonshire Mall or Walkerville through the University of Windsor to Lasalle. These are just a few examples of small and mid-size cities that could easily afford rail transit if it comes at the price of a bus lane.

The O-Train model is also relevant for major cities on peripheral or suburban routes. In New York, this approach could be used to activate the Rockaway Beach branch for a fraction of the projected cost, or even (with some additional challenges) to build the TriboroRx. It can then be upgraded over time, as demand growth requires. The O-Train should be a model that is emulated throughout North America.

Neptis Report Response

This post is in response to Michael Schabas, who very kindly responded to my review of his report on Metrolinx's "Big Move" prepared for the Neptis Foundation.

I greatly appreciate you taking the time to respond to my review. I found your study of Metrolinx’s plans to be very informative and well thought-out. I also felt that your inclusion of real regional rail in the study was an excellent choice.

I definitely agree that loco-hauled trains have a purpose, but I think they’re best used on longer distance, limited stop trips where their acceleration time penalty is less important. That’s generally how they are used in Germany: Dostos operate many RegioBahn and RegioExpress services, while S-Bahns in major cities are all-EMU. I’m definitely a supporter of two distinct levels of service, like in Germany, with CityRail providing rapid transit-style service roughly out to the inner edge of the Greenbelt, and a Regional Express service, perhaps locomotive-hauled, out to places like Barrie, Kitchener, and Niagara Falls. It could make limited stops within the GTA and operate less frequently, perhaps hourly or twice-hourly. Bilevels would be less of an issue on those trains as the bilevel loading and unloading time penalty would be less problematic than on the high-frequency CityRail services. They would be a good place to use the existing GO rolling stock for the rest of its service life.

While I am obviously a big supporter of real regional rail, I think that the DRL is a very important project precisely because the corridor can’t be very well served by regional rail. Connections from surface routes, including the Eglinton Crosstown, to the Richmond Hill line, which is the closest parallel to the DRL, would be extremely awkward given its deep valley location. Its winding route makes it slower than other regional rail routes and the risk of flooding also poses problems in an era of concerns about “resiliency.” I agree that connections at Main Street could be designed to be as painless as possible, but it is still not an ideal setup and would impose a time penalty. The DRL is a case where, unlike the other regional rail corridors, the existing corridor isn’t adequate to meet the area’s needs. A new corridor is needed.

The DRL is also incredibly useful because it would be able to provide a very fine-grained service to some of the fastest-developing parts of the city. It’s hard to argue that stations in Leslieville, Liberty Village, Cityplace, the East Bayfront, or the West Don Lands would not be very well used. While I agree that some of the DRL’s future riders are currently be using the east-west streetcar routes, those lines provide a pretty poor service over long distances, which is why their ridership has been dropping steadily for two decades. Better service could attract back many people who have given up on the 501. As it extends up Don Mills, which wouldn’t be possible for a regional rail route, it would serve the heavily developed area along that street as well as effectively connect to a number of very busy bus routes. This would also dramatically improve service for many existing riders and could attract people to transit who currently find the car more attractive than a long bus ride to the Yonge subway. I am not certain how well the TTC’s ridership modelling for the project accounts for all of these potential new sources of ridership. Even if it would not necessarily add as many new riders as other routes, as your report suggests, I think that the dramatic improvement in service quality for thousands of existing transit riders makes the project very worthwhile.

It makes perfect sense that Bombardier would be much more receptive to a contract cancellation if they got a comparably large contract as a replacement. That would be a very good way to reduce the cost of cancellation, though this decision would need to be made almost immediately.

Reacting to the Neptis Big Move Transit Review

This article is shared with Urban Toronto.

Debates over Metrolinx's Big Move returned to the headlines this week with the release of a detailed new report prepared by planner Michael Schabas for the Neptis Foundation. While some observers may dismiss it as “yet another” study of transit in Toronto, we can never have too much information about a plan that will, after all, cost tens of billions of dollars. The report brings some useful and occasionally provocative suggestions to the table and also effectively criticizes some of the weakness of the GTA’s transit planning process. This article will examine some of Schabas’ conclusions.


Regional Rail and Fare Integration
I was extremely pleased to read a detailed assessment of the enormous benefits for reasonable cost that would be produced by real regional rail in Toronto. As Schabas effectively argues, Metrolinx’s GO electrification study was flawed as it concentrated on a mediocre and arbitrary 30-minute frequency that research demonstrates is inadequate to generate the massive ridership increase that comes from passengers not needing to rely on schedules, and because it insisted on the retention of massive 10-car bi-level trains. Both of these assumptions greatly limit the potential benefits of electric multiple unit operation. More importantly, the study did not consider the huge ridership that could be gained by allowing riders to pay the same fare to ride regional rail and local transit.  (More on fare integration in an upcoming article)

Schabas’ solution is to maintain a separate fleet of locomotive-hauled bi-levels for peak period service while using smaller electric multiple unit trains to maintain high frequency off-peak. While certainly a better approach than 30-minute infrequent bi-levels all day, it does not correspond with best practices on most real regional rail systems. They manage with a single fleet for peak and off-peak even with far higher ridership than Toronto. Many German S-Bahn systems, for example, move far more people than GO in the peak periods with single-level multiple units. They accomplish this through high frequency, just like the subway, which also moves far more people than GO. Bi-level cars may seem like a reasonable solution to add capacity, but in fact they are one of the biggest causes of capacity limitations on the system: because they take so long to unload at Union Station, headways are severely limited. With a better platform layout and EMU trains with no stairs and more doors per car to speed loading and unloading, frequencies of five minutes or better would be possible. Such a system would be able to move far more people in the peak period than even GO’s massive 12-car trains.

The benefits of EMUs go far beyond shorter headways and reduced emissions; a cutting-edge regional rail multiple unit like the Stadler FLIRT or comparable models from Bombardier would provide dramatic acceleration improvements over existing GO trains. A FLIRT making all stops from Hamilton, for example, would be as fast as existing GO trains from Hamilton running express after Oakville. This would permit the addition of more stops for rapid-transit-style service without sacrificing travel times. (The benefits of electrification will be examined in greater detail in a future article.)

Loco-hauled trains could be retained if necessary for longer distance trains to outlying cities like Kitchener or Barrie, which would likely be limited-stop services where acceleration is less important.

CityRail Plan central area, cartography by Craig White

The Downtown Relief Line
The Neptis report goes a bit astray when it examines the Downtown Relief Line. There is no question that real regional rail (not “GO Trains,” as has been reported in the media) would provide significant relief to the subway system. However, that is only one of the many benefits of the DRL.
The DRL would be extremely useful even in the context of CityRail because it would provide service to riders in the few areas that aren’t particularly well served by regional rail. Schabas suggests that riders on the Danforth line could easily transfer to regional rail at Main Street, but that connection is in reality quite awkward. Given that passengers would be required to walk considerably further than the Spadina station connection between Bloor and YUS lines, it is likely that relatively few people would choose it over continuing to transfer at Bloor-Yonge.

The effect on the Yonge Line north of Bloor would also be limited. Most riders on the line, which will become increasingly overcrowded as it is extended north, transfer from connecting bus routes from the east. These riders would switch en masse to a Don Mills extension of the DRL, dramatically reducing congestion on Yonge and providing much better service to riders in that part of the city. Unlike the Georgetown corridor, for example, regional rail in the Richmond Hill corridor would not connect very effectively with surface routes because of its deep valley location.

Finally, the DRL serves some of the fastest-developing parts of the city. The waterfront, East Bayfront, Portlands, Cityplace, and Leslieville areas are all seeing massive growth and development. Furthermore, it serves areas where existing transit service is slow and unreliable. It could reverse the significant ridership declines that the east-west downtown streetcar routes have suffered over the past two decades.

The Downtown Relief Line, map by Christopher Livett

The key problem with the cost/benefit case for the DRL as evaluated in the Neptis report is the extraordinarily high cost estimate provided by Metrolinx. The most striking feature of almost all transit planning reports over the past decade is the complete absence of attention to cost control. Very few studies include an examination of different approaches (i.e. underground vs. elevated) or routes and the cost implications. This is in stark contrast with earlier reports, such as the original 1985 Downtown Relief Line study, in which cost was the primary factor being considered when different routes were evaluated. That report concluded that the most economical routing would be along the rail corridor from Bay Street to the Don River, where vacant land is available for a subway. The cost savings would surely be dramatic since virtually no new infrastructure beyond tracks and surface stations would be required in that segment. It would have the added benefit of running right through the heart of the rapidly developing East Bayfront and West Don Lands areas. Such a route does not appear to have been considered in the contemporary DRL reports. The Don Mills segment, as well, is planned to be built entirely underground even though an elevated routing through that area would clearly be feasible and would likely produce enormous cost savings (See "The Rising Cost of Rapid Transit Construction" for more detail). Underground construction costs in Toronto are becoming increasingly out-of-line when compared with peer cities both in Canada and Europe.

Schabas uncovers a particularly striking case of inattention to costs in the Scarborough rapid transit Benefits Case Assessment:
 “TTC seems to be requiring a fairly elaborate and expensive yard. The BCA (which was prepared by consultants) notes, ‘The cost of a Vancouver facility with comparable capacity was roughly $200m lower, although the yard alignment and maintenance practices differ from the TTC’s.’ If Metrolinx thinks there may be the opportunity to save $200 million, surely it should give this more attention than a short footnote?” (60)


Automated Light Metro
Certainly one of the most provocative elements of the Neptis report is its advocacy for automated light metro. While the technology has been extremely popular and successfully implemented around the world, in cities as varied as Copenhagen, Paris, London, Vancouver, Tokyo, Moscow, and Madrid, debates about transit in Toronto have remained rigidly within the subway vs. light rail framework.
Part of the blame for the technology falling out of fashion in Toronto comes from the Scarborough RT, which is the only example of automated light metro in the GTA (though the TTC chooses to have an operator in the cab). This is a poor example of the technology, however, that should not discredit an entire approach to transit. Automated light metro does not need to rely on a proprietary technology like the RT with its complicated and sometimes problematic linear induction propulsion system. At its simplest, automated light metro is just a driverless, fully grade-separated train that is lighter and quieter than the subway to facilitate elevated operation when desired.

The Neptis report illustrates a number of significant benefits to the Automated Light Metro technology. Its operating costs over the long term are significantly lower than non-grade-separated light rail since it does not require a driver. The lack of a driver also makes it possible to run shorter trains at maximum frequency all the time for no additional cost. This is a major benefit on less busy routes where the need for a driver could result in unreasonably long waits for passengers. Vehicle costs, in many cases, are also lower than for LRT at a given passenger capacity. Schabas makes the case fairly effectively that automated light metro would be suitable for the Eglinton line, providing faster trips, better frequencies, and greater reliability. Altogether, he persuasively argues that it would provide a significantly better cost/benefit ratio over the long term than the existing LRT plan.

The Neptis report also underplays the enormous importance of transfers from feeder buses in providing the high ridership that makes Toronto’s existing suburban rapid transit so successful. The large majority of riders at Toronto’s suburban subway stations don’t walk to the station from the surrounding neighbourhood; instead, they arrive by bus. There has not been much study about whether bus riders will transfer to a surface LRT that only offers, according to Metrolinx, about 25% faster trips than a bus. This is of critical importance on Eglinton, since if passengers on north-south bus routes decide to stay on the bus until they reach the Danforth line, rather than transferring to the Eglinton Crosstown, it would make the justification of the multi-billion dollar project much weaker.

Vancouver's Canada Line, image by Michael Berry from Wikipedia

The Canada Line in Vancouver is an excellent example of an automated light metro line with a comparable capacity and length to the Eglinton Crosstown line (more on this subject here). It is, however, completely grade-separated and so will offer a considerably faster and more reliable trip than a surface LRT that faces obstruction from traffic lights. It is also fully automated, permitting higher frequencies and lower operating costs, particularly off-peak. Built as a public-private partnership, it cost governments $2.5 billion—less than half of the Eglinton Crosstown—and was completed in time for the 2010 Olympics as planned.

Of course, all of these points assume that redesigning the Eglinton line yet again is desirable. Certainly, it would do nothing to dispel the image of disarray that has surrounded many recent Toronto transit projects. It could also bring significant cancellation costs, though they might be reduced if Bombardier is retained to produce the vehicles for the redesigned line. While it is difficult to argue with Schabas when he says that this project will be with us for decades so it should be built right, there are significant costs to halting and redesigning the project yet again and the risk of the useful project falling through entirely is very real.

Eglinton-Crosstown LRT News

The Eglinton-Crosstown LRT (Source: Metrolinx)

This article is shared with Urban Toronto.

This morning, Metrolinx announced its decision to proceed with an alternative financing and procurement model for the new Eglinton Crosstown LRT. In other words, private consortia will compete for the right to build and operate the new line instead of the TTC. If the contract is well designed, this approach can transfer the risk of delays and cost overruns from the government to the private partner. The Canada Line in Vancouver is a good domestic example of this type of procurement, and its private consortium completed the project more-or-less on budget and in time for the 2010 Olympics.

The TTC’s response quoted in the Star verged on the bizarre, trying to cause anxiety that riders would be forced to pay separate fares to ride the new Eglinton line. This certainly need not be the case, as the Canada Line is fully integrated into the existing transit system with seamless connections. The TTC tried to claim that Eglinton Crosstown and the Canada Line are “a completely different scenario because the Canada Line is restricted to a single route with far fewer connections than the Eglinton line will have, and no zones.” It is difficult to understand what they meant by far fewer connections, since the Canada Line connects with the existing Skytrain and numerous bus routes. The presence of zone fares in Vancouver is also an irrelevant distraction. The TTC understandably isn’t enthusiastic about losing control of a major piece of transit infrastructure in the middle of its service area, but a well-designed AFP could prove to be a cost-effective option.

Eglinton Crosstown and the Canada Line are hardly “completely different” and there is absolutely no reason why Eglinton can’t and won’t be completely integrated into the TTC’s fare system. The main difference between the two lines is that the Canada Line cost $2 billion for 19.2 km of fully grade-separated rapid transit, while the Eglinton line is projected to cost three times as much (~$6 billion at last count) for 25 km (including rehabilitation of the existing Scarborough RT corridor) with far less capacity and a reliability-killing on-street section in the middle.

The Canada Line Bridge over the Fraser River (Source: Canada Line)

With cost estimates already so high, there is little incentive for the private consortia to keep costs low. If the private bidders were to be able to reduce costs to even twice that of the Canada Line per kilometre, it would likely be possible to fully grade-separate the Eglinton Crosstown (perhaps with an elevated segment through western Scarborough) without increasing its current budget.

Transit-Oriented Development Failure: Brampton Edition

It is difficult to find a better example of the failure to site major development around transit infrastructure than the planned Osmington mall in Northwest Brampton. This vast project is intended to encompass a regional mall of over 1 million square feet, 300,000 square feet of office space, 2,000 residential units, and a 350-room hotel. 4,600 people will commute there for work every day. It will be designed on “lifestyle centre” principles, similar to the new Don Mills Centre, which are intended to create a suburban experience that is more pedestrian-friendly than the traditional mall in a sea of parking. Regional malls adjacent to TTC subway stations generate thousands of transit riders per day. It’s hard to imagine anything better suited to being located at a suburban transit hub.

Unfortunately, this immense new development will be located just beyond reasonable walking distance of the Georgetown GO corridor and the Mount Pleasant station. Instead, it will be built as suburban malls have always been: at an arterial intersection next to the planned Brampton North-South expressway, a bleak 1.2 km walk from the rail station. The planning report pays lip service to “transit-oriented development,” but the Osmington project will not be oriented to the rail corridor that should be the backbone of transit in the region. Meanwhile, Mount Pleasant station will be surrounded by quaint townhouses and strip mall retail that will generate at best a few dozen riders a day. While townhouses may create the old-timey village-around-a-station effect that feels like appropriate transit-oriented development, a large shopping centre, even with a suburban design, generates far more riders.

Of course the existing commuter-oriented, peak-only GO rail service wouldn’t be terribly useful for a shopping destination. But CityRail-style regional rail service would provide rapid transit service and this development could be one of its major anchor destinations.

CityRail In Depth: Corridor Capacity

Toronto is facing a transportation crisis. We have more people using every form of transportation than any of the systems were designed to accommodate. Our best chance to expand rapid transit throughout the GTA for the smallest price is to add a new level of train service, referred to here as CityRail. This is the second in a series of in depth articles exploring aspects of CityRail.

This article is shared with Urban Toronto.

This article defines an ultimate scenario for various rail services in the Greater Toronto Area. It will explore rail corridor capacity to accommodate the maximum foreseeable level of CityRail service without excluding other corridor users. Using conservative assumptions based on international standards and a modern signalling system, it is clear that an extremely high level of service can be accommodated with a relatively limited expansion of the existing physical infrastructure. CityRail doesn't need billions of dollars of big infrastructure projects. In fact, it could be implemented with a handful of small targeted projects combined with the improvements Metrolinx is already undertaking.

This post assumes the establishment of three distinct levels of service, which mirrors most European systems. Within urban areas, there is a high frequency and frequent-stop rapid-transit-style service (such as the S-Bahn in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, and the RER in France), which would be CityRail in Toronto. It would run roughly to the edge of the developed urban area while towns and cities beyond would be served by a regional express service operating at lower frequency, like the RegionalBahn trains in Germany and TER in France. In Toronto, these trains would have on-board comfort similar to existing GO trains and would make only major station stops out to Niagara, Barrie, Kitchener, Cobourg, and perhaps Peterborough. An interesting option could be the provision of two service classes, with second class similar to GO and first class more like VIA, with reclining seats and food service. The final level of service is InterCity or high-speed service, which would offer a VIA Rail level of comfort and on-board service and be geared to passengers travelling distances greater than 100km. CityRail and the Regional Express services directly complement each other, with the former providing high-frequency and high-capacity for shorter trips while the latter provides the comfort and speed desired by passengers travelling longer distances. No single type of rail service could adequately serve all of Southern Ontario, but three levels of service will permit frequent stops and short headways for people travelling shorter distance while retaining comfort desired by longer-distance riders.

CityRail assumes the installation of a communication-based train control (CBTC) system in all corridors. CBTC uses modern wireless technology to keep track of exactly where trains are at all times. Rather than simply defining large sections of track that can only be occupied by one train at a time and notifying train drivers by signal lights, it can constantly maintain a safe space around each train that varies depending on the stopping distance required by each train at its current speed. It can greatly increase capacity on a line compared with current technology, particularly when different trains have different stopping requirements. It’s also a major safety improvement, since it makes absolutely sure that no two trains occupy the same track at the same time, and can even automatically stop an errant train without any intervention by its driver. Following a serious commuter rail crash in Los Angeles, the U.S. Congress has mandated that all American passenger rail corridors be equipped with such a system by December 2015. A state-of-the-art signalling system is the best way to add capacity to a rail network without spending vast sums on more tracks.

Adopting a signalling system that is compatible with the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) standard is by far the best option for CityRail. European countries have spent billions of dollars developing this most advanced signalling standard. Better yet, it’s not exclusive to a single signalling system supplier; instead, all major suppliers have developed systems that are compatible with the standard. This means that components and future upgrades can be obtained from whichever supplier is most economical. Standard North American signalling systems have received far less research and development investment and have far fewer competitive suppliers. They are also far less capable, explaining the comparatively poor performance of North American heavy rail lines. Freight trains would not share tracks with CityRail trains, so there is no need for freight operators to install ERTMS equipment in most of their locomotives. For the relative handful of trains that serve local traffic in the City of Toronto, a small subfleet of ERTMS-equipped locomotives could be maintained. VIA Rail is a relatively small operator, so the cost of re-fitting its equipment would be comparatively small. For some trains, it might be possible to use electric ERTMS-equipped locomotives while they run through the GTA and then replace them with diesels at the last electrified station. Any potential high-speed line would use ERTMS-compatible signalling anyway. There is the potential for bugs which would need to be worked out in order to make ERTMS work in North America, but a major new signalling installation like CityRail should use the most capable and widely available international standard.

The diagram above describes an ultimate operating scenario in which CityRail is operating at high frequency on all corridors, while accommodating intercity, Regional Express, and Airport Rail Link services. This is meant to focus primarily on CityRail and is not meant to be an exhaustive or precise depiction of future rail service. For simplicity, it does not include the use of the North Toronto line nor services that run less than once an hour. I have assumed a relatively conservative maximum capacity of 24 trains per hour per direction on dedicated CityRail tracks (roughly every two and a half minutes) and 12 trains per hour (every five minutes) on other passenger tracks. For comparison, the busiest section of the RER accommodates over 30 trains per hour (less than two minutes apart), while the Munich S-Bahn tunnel handles 30. Crossrail in London will operate with 24 trains per hour per direction when it opens, expandable to 32. Some intercity corridors operate with even closer headways. While changes to regulations and operating practices will be necessary, the laws of physics are not different in Paris, so it is possible to run regional rail trains at high frequency in Toronto.

The main constraints on train frequency are the signalling system, train braking distance, train acceleration, dwell time at stations, and the need for fast trains to overtake slower trains. The installation of ERTMS would eliminate all signalling constraints. Train braking distance and acceleration would be greatly improved by operating lighter, more modern, electrified European standard trains, particularly for CityRail. It could be more problematic on non-CityRail tracks where VIA and other trains must share the corridor, which is why I have assumed a more generous 5 minute minimum headway. Dwell time at stations can be mitigated by rolling stock that is designed for rapid transit operation, with many doors and high floors. The Spanish Solution, involving a platform on both sides of the train so all doors can be used, is another option. At some stations, a two-track corridor could expand into four platform tracks so that a following train could pull into a parallel track as the one ahead is departing. Finally, the need to overtake is not so severe within the City of Toronto as frequent-stop CityRail trains will be in their own corridor separate from express trains. Regional Express, intercity and Airport Rail Link trains could all travel at the same speed through the city. Any conflict between non-stop intercity trains and stopping Regional Express trains could be resolved with passing tracks at stations. Changes to operating practices and regulations, combined with careful scheduling, will permit high frequency rapid-transit-style service on all CityRail corridors without requiring a massive investment in more track.

Lakeshore, Milton, Kitchener, and Stouffville (as they are currently named) are the CityRail corridors with the highest demand potential given the relatively dense areas and high-capacity connecting routes they serve. Richmond Hill, Bolton, and Barrie have somewhat lower potential given that they either closely parallel existing rapid transit routes or pass though relatively inaccessible or lightly developed areas for much of their length. I have therefore assumed a very substantial ultimate CityRail service of every 5 minutes on the former group and every 10 minutes on the latter. At the outset, trains would likely run at half as often. Lakeshore, Kitchener, and Barrie would also see up to 2 Regional Express trains per hour. The Kitchener corridor would have a separate pair of tracks for its Regional Express services, which would be shared with 4 Airport Rail Link trains per hour and two intercity or high-speed trains. The Lakeshore would also have a dedicated pair of tracks for Regional Express, intercity and high-speed services. As considerably more CityRail trains would be operating on the west side of the city than on the east, those trains would need a place to turn. Rather than carrying out that relatively time-consuming process at Union Station, the most valuable real estate in the city, I propose that it be done at a station on the site of the existing GO Don Yard at Cherry Street. There is ample space there for multiple platforms to turn trains, with the added benefit of serving the new West Don Lands and Port Lands developments. Toronto's rail network, with targeted improvements, can accommodate even a very high level of rail service.

The infrastructure expansion that would be required in the City of Toronto to provide even this extremely extensive ultimate level of service is relatively small. It would likely include:

• Building a dedicated pair of CityRail tracks in the CP Galt Sub (GO Milton) corridor.
• Expanding the Weston corridor to 4 tracks north of the Junction and 6 tracks south, which is already approved in the current Metrolinx EA.
• Expanding Lakeshore East to 4 tracks.
• Providing a continuous pair of tracks on the Stouffville, Richmond Hill, Barrie, and Bolton corridors.
• Flying (grade-separated) junction where the Bolton and Barrie lines enter the Kitchener/Milton corridor, and where Stouffville enters the Lakeshore corridor.
• A grade separation between the Milton corridor and the Kitchener intercity/ARL tracks.
• The re-alignment of tracks through the Union Station Rail Corridor to eliminate the need for different lines to cross and unnecessary switching.
• The addition of simple surface stations along all routes to serve dense development and major connecting bus, subway, and streetcar routes.
• A station complex at Cherry Street to turn and service trains.
• Electrification of all corridors.

Many of the improvements that would be required for the introduction of CityRail are already being built or planned by Metrolinx. However, their true potential is only unlocked with modern electrified, multiple unit rolling stock and advanced signalling systems. None of the projects listed above require lengthy underground construction or new corridors. In fact, almost all of it can easily be accommodated in the existing GO corridors. CityRail would add hundreds of kilometres of rapid transit to the GTA without needing to bore a single tunnel. The only needed physical plant is simple surface stations, selective grade separations, new tracks in existing corridors, and electrification. These are comparatively simple and inexpensive projects by the standards of rapid transit. The GTA is blessed with an extensive network of rail corridors, and if used to their full potential through the implementation of CityRail, they could greatly enhance transit service throughout the region.

CityRail In Depth: Union Station

This is the first in a series of CityRail In Depth articles, which explore detailed aspects of the CityRail concept and rail service in the Greater Toronto Area. This article is shared with Urban Toronto.

Union Station is the critical point on any regional rail system in Toronto. All corridors funnel through Union, and its location ensures that it will remain by far the busiest station for the foreseeable future. While the beauty of its Great Hall is enduring, if tarnished, the 'business end' of the station—the actual tracks and platforms—was built in 1927 for a very different set of operating practices from modern regional rail.

Union Station is currently undergoing a major renovation project. Passengers will see big changes when it is complete, including the addition of a whole floor of shopping under the station. The main improvement to rail service is the long-overdue addition of many more stairways to the platforms, including a new west side York Street concourse in parallel to the current GO concourse at Bay Street to the east side.

Union Station Revitalization Section, image courtesy of the City of Toronto

The original station included few platform access points: two staircases from the current VIA departures concourse and another pair from the parallel exit concourses. The GO concourse was added to provide several more stair access points to some tracks. The platforms themselves are low, unlike Montreal Central Station, Penn Station in New York, or virtually all stations in Europe; this means that passengers must climb steps to reach the car level, which dramatically increases the time required to board and unload trains and makes boarding much more difficult for passengers in wheelchairs. The renovation project will solve most of the problems of limited platform access and poor station circulation, but it will do nothing to improve the problems related to platform width and height.

The Union Station rail corridor has also recently been rebuilt, more-or-less to its original 1927 layout, with the addition of a fly-under to the west of the station. Trains are forced to slow down as they go through many switches. Awkward operating practices compound the problem: running the Airport Rail Link to platform track 1 will force it to cross many other lines at grade, reducing capacity and reliability on all routes. GO Trains dwell for a very long time at the station compared to most international railways, which is the main limitation on capacity. The major causes are the large size of the trains coupled with the relatively few doors per car, which means trains take a long time to load and unload. This is compounded by the low platforms, narrow platforms, and relatively few access points. Most international regional rail systems runthrough trains, which means that they don’t occupy valuable space at the busiest station in the system as they carry out the procedures required to turn the train. These procedures are also much more onerous in North America than in Europe, including the requirement for a time consuming brake test every time the train is turned.

Union Station Glass Atrium and Bush Shed Renovation, image courtesy of GO Transit

Current Planning

Metrolinx explored these capacity issues in the recent Union 2031 study (helpfully provided by Steve Munro’s blog). It examines a number of scenarios and possible changes to the station to enhance its capacity. While it is admirable that Metrolinx is looking to the future, it is unfortunate that the study wasn’t conducted before the current revitalization project began. That would have allowed the project to incorporate more improvements to train operations, in addition to aesthetic and commercial upgrades. While useful, the study includes some very questionable assumptions. Foremost among them is the establishment of five minutes as the absolute minimum dwell time possible, even for a through train (turning trains would require ten minutes). There is no explanation of how this was derived, and it is far higher than standard international practice, where trains dwell at stations far busier than Union for times consistently measured in seconds. This assumption colours the entire study and makes the station appear far more constrained than it is by international standards. As an extreme comparison, it handles about 200,000 passengers per day on 15 tracks, while Tokyo’s Shinjuku JR Station handles over 1.5 million per day on 14 tracks. Paris’ Châtelet-Les Halles station on the RER handles half a million riders per day on only seven tracks.

In the short-to-medium term, the Metrolinx study reasonably deems the current arrangement acceptable once platform access improvements are complete. In the much longer term, it looks at several major capital expenditures that would provide an additional pair of tracks underground, but that’s a costly project when Union is nowhere near international standards of capacity. An even madder scheme would dead-end Georgetown and Milton lines at Bathurst North, destroying the possibility of an interconnected regional rail system once and for all. Other cities, like Paris, Munich, and London, have spent or are spending billions to correct the mistake of separate stations on regional rail routes. It would be a truly baffling step backwards for Toronto to go in the other direction. Fortunately, despite the press that such schemes have received, Metrolinx doesn’t believe that any of these changes will be required any time soon.

Union Station Revitalization, Shed and Atrium Section, image courtesy of the City of Toronto

Potential Solutions

There are several options for modifying Union’s platform arrangement to enhance capacity.

The international standard is for platforms that are far wider than those at Union. It could be possible to create reasonably wide platforms by shifting the tracks into the space now occupied by the baggage platform. While a seemingly simple solution, it runs into difficulty as columns currently run from directly beneath the current tracks down to bedrock. The tracks cannot simply be moved without finding new ways to support the weight of trains. Shifting the columns would have been a very good idea, given that builders are already in the process of digging out the entire underside of the station, including completely removing and rebuilding the columns. Unfortunately such a plan was not included in a retail- rather than transportation-focused Union revitalization.

Union Station Revitalization Column Replacement, image courtesy of the City of Toronto

There may be other options for shifting the tracks while keeping the columns in their present position. For example, steel beams could run beneath the tracks, connecting the columns and carrying the weight of trains onto the adjacent two columns. Chicago has recently developed a capacity enhancement strategy for its own Union Station. It has a very similar platform arrangement to Toronto’s Union, and its planners propose widening its passenger platforms by eliminating the baggage platforms. If a new means of supporting the tracks is possible, this is the simplest solution and would produce standard island platforms of reasonable width.

An even bolder option for CityRail would involve the removal of tracks (numbered from the North) 2, 3, 5 and 7. This would provide four tracks and extremely wide platforms in a “Spanish Solution.” Though the number of platform tracks used by CityRail would be reduced, the arrangement would be comparable to stations like Chatelet-Les Halles in Paris, which moves far more passengers than Union in a CityRail-type of system. A new, detailed circulation study of these options would be necessary to determine which would provide the highest passenger throughput and closest headways. It needs to be done on the basis of international standards, without including strange assumptions like the five-minute minimum dwell time.Issues of corridor and track capacity will be examined further in an upcoming CityRail In Depth article.

Any real improvement to the platform and track arrangement at Union would likely require the removal of the Bush trainshed, which is the roof covering the track area. The central portion is currently being removed and replaced with a high glass roof, while the remainder is being preserved as a heritage structure. The Bush design was a fairly common and utilitarian approach to covering tracks that was popular in the pre-war period. It has historic significance, but it is far from the last of its kind. The Bush shed makes it difficult to change the track arrangement, raise platforms to the level of train doors, and accommodate overhead catenary for electrification. It also creates a dank and uncomfortable setting for passengers to wait for their trains. Union Station is a very important piece of transportation infrastructure in the GTA It may be necessary to sacrifice the trainshed, just as it was necessary to sacrifice the architecturally significant Terminal One in order to modernize and expand Pearson Airport. Unlike Terminal One, it should be feasible to dismantle the trainshed and move it to another location in the city, where it could be repurposed into something like the Wychwood Art Barns.

Union Station Revitalization Bush Shed Green Roof and Glass Atrium, image courtesy of GO Transit

  

Union Station is the linchpin of any regional rail system in the Greater Toronto Area. CityRail requires a reasonable track and platform arrangement at Union in order to function reliably and offer high capacity. There are many options to improve the station without the need for drastic measures like separate underground platforms, so Union should be able to function well as the hub of CityRail for the foreseeable future without a total rebuild.